CR Council Election Rules
(The following content is based on the content of the CRC white paper，In case of ambiguity, please refer to the CRC white paper)
1. Cyber Republic（CR）
Cyber Republic (CR) is the community that has naturally formed around Elastos. CR consists of ELA token holders, Elastos Foundation members, Elastos ecosystem partners, and any other teams and individuals that contribute to developing Elastos’ technologies and community.
2. Cyber Republic Consensus (CRC)
The Cyber Republic Consensus is the third Elastos consensus mechanism after PoW and DPoS. The purpose of CRC is to provide a consensus-based community governance mechanism that will drive Elastos’ technological and ecosystem development, dispute resolution, and management of community assets, as well as to establish incentives to foster community participation in the governance of and contribution to the Elastos community.
3. Two Major Roles of the CRC
3.1. CR Council Member: A delegate elected by a community vote during a blockchain-based election. According to the CRC, CR Council Members act as the “Supernodes” for all community members and make decisions related to community affairs. Their rights and responsibilities include the following:
1) The rights and responsibilities that all normal community members have;
2) The right to recommend proposals – that is, to put forth potential proposals originating from within the community;
3) The right to vote on proposals – that is, the right to vote for, against, or to abstain from voting on proposals.
3.2. Community Members: All token holders in the CR community. Their rights and responsibilities include the following:
1) The right to vote in elections: the right to cast votes in support of any candidate running for CR Council Member.
2) The right to be elected – that is, the right to run in the election for CR Council Member.
3) The right to submit proposals to CR Council Members, who can recommend their proposals as official CRC proposals if they so choose.
4) The right to monitor the behaviors of CR Council Members and to vote to impeach them. Each community member can monitor the behaviors of CR Council Members and can vote to impeach Council Members who they find unfit.
5) The right to supervise the proposal process and to object to proposals. Community members can monitor the entire proposal process using the client, including the status of both voting and implementation. Proposals from CR Council Members that pass CR Council voting will be subject to a public referendum, during which time community members can object to proposals through a community vote.
4. CR Council
4.1. CR Council
The CR Council is presently comprised of 12 seats which are filled by a community election conducted on the blockchain. As the community expands, the number of Council Members will be subject to change, though such a change would require that a consensus be reached by the community through CRC.
The CR Council differs from normal councils and boards of directors in that it is a distributed body of individuals. In principle, the CR Council Members do not need to know each other, communicate with each other, or have common goals because all consensus actions revolve around proposals and voting. The CR Council is not a regular organization per se, but a decentralized entity whose collective decision making is facilitated by blockchain in much the same way Supernodes operate within DPoS consensus.
The CR Council is represented by a permanent ELA wallet address set in the blockchain code. The ELA available to the current CR Council is stored at this wallet address.
4.2. Election Rules
All community members that intend to participate in the CR Council Election must have an Elastos DID. Each member can issue the election participation transaction in his or her wallet to notify the community of his or her participation in the CR Council Election and to make a 5,000 ELA deposit to verify his or her eligibility to participate. If a participant is not elected, the original deposit will be returned to him or her in full.
CR Council Members are elected through a voting process using ELA. All voting information will be recorded in real time on the blockchain and reflected in the client. When voting concludes, the top 12 participants who have obtained the most votes will become CR Council Members.
During the election period, the participant can opt out of the current election at any time, and will not be able to participate in the current election of CR members again. After withdrawing from the election for 72 hours (2,160 main chain block generation cycles), the deposited ELA can be retrieved.
4.3. Impeachment of Council Members
As CR Council Members serve their terms, community members can at any time vote to impeach council members whose performance they find unsatisfactory. Once the number of votes to impeach a council member exceeds the equivalent of 20% of the circulating supply of ELA (the ELA circulating supply is defined as ELA outside of the CR assets address)participant nodes, the impeached member will be automatically removed from the council.
Being elected as a CR Council Member is an honor and a privilege, and it also carries the responsibility to govern the community and develop the Elastos ecosystem. In order to incentivize CR Council Members to better perform their roles, the Elastos DPoS Consensus has reserved the right for each CR Council Member to operate his or her own DPoS Supernode, which is also a responsibility and an obligation. This Supernode is automatically an active node; because it is not elected by voting, it does not receive voting rewards.
4.5. Term in Council
Generally, CR Council Members serve a term of one year (specifically, the time period of 262,800 main chain blocks). One month prior to the conclusion of the term (the time period of 21,900 main chain blocks), a new CR Council Member Election will be automatically initiated.
If a CR Council Member is successfully impeached, that council member will automatically be removed from council, and will be stripped of his of her roles and responsibilities.
Additionally, if a CR Council Member’s DPoS Supernode goes into “Inactive” status, then his or her roles and responsibilities will be temporarily suspended until the DPoS Supernode returns to “Active” status. If a CR Council Member’s DPoS Supernode goes into “Illegal” status, then that Council Member will also be removed from the council.
When the number of CR Council Members is less than 2/3 of the total number of available seats, Council Member Elections will be automatically initiated.
4.6. Number of Votes
The quantity of ELA held by a community member is equal to the number of votes that member has the right to cast, and is not necessarily a whole number.
During an election, a tokenholder’s votes can be cast for one or more candidates, based on the tokenholder’s preferences. The right to vote may also be used to impeach a council member or to vote against community proposals approved by the CR Council. Votes are calculated independently based on different voting scenarios, and can be reused.
For example, if a tokenholder has 18.5 ELA, then that member has the right to cast 18.5 votes during an election. Such a tokenholder may cast 10 votes for Candidate A, and cast the other 8.5 votes for Candidate B. In addition, the voter can also use a maximum of 18.5 votes to impeach a current Council Member. Of course, when voting to impeach council members, votes cannot be reused, meaning that votes cast to impeach Council Member A cannot also be cast to impeach Council Member B. None of these voting practices will affect the 18.5 votes that this tokenholder may cast during DPoS Elections.
Note that when tokenholders conduct transactions using ELA, the number of votes they may cast will be affected. If a certain transaction causes a tokenholder’s remaining number of votes to fall below the number of votes cast in a certain voting scenario, then that tokenholder’s votes are canceled.
4.7. Making and Returning the Deposit
During a term in council, a CR Council Member must make a deposit of 5,000 ELA. The 5,000 ELA deposit will also be used as each Council Member’s Supernode deposit, which is a requirement of all Supernodes, and is forfeited in the case that malicious activity is committed by that node.
After the conclusion of a council member’s term (including cases of replacement during election and successful impeachment), an amount will be deducted from the ELA on deposit according to the ratio of the term that will not be served and the number of proposals on which the Council Member failed to vote. The remaining sum of ELA will be returned to the council member’s wallet. If a CR Council Member is removed from council because the member’s Supernode enters “Illegal” status, then the full amount of the ELA on deposit will be forfeited.
For example, suppose that a council member performed his or her duties normally until the ensuing election. For the duration of the member’s term, there were M number of proposals of which the council member voted on N number of proposals. The remaining amount on deposit is expressed as P (it is possible for the value of P to be reduced to less than 5,000 ELA in case of malicious activity committed by the DPoS Supernode). Then, the amount of the deposit to be returned is calculated as follows:
R = P * (N / M)
If the Council Member leaves his or her post early due to impeachment, suppose that the real block duration that member served in council is T. The deposit that should be returned is calculated as follows:
R = P * (T / 262,800) * (N / M)
The amount of the deposit forfeited will be permanently removed from circulation – the equivalent of being burned.